China\u27s New Automobile Policy Fails to Comply with Its WTO Commitments by Wang, Jean
The WTO Violations in China’s New Automobile Policy As it Seeks to Protect its Domestic 
Conglomerates Through Non-Market Means 
 
By Chunyu Jean Wang1
1 JD at American University, graduated in May 2005. 
2
I. Introduction 
 On June 1, 2004, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), after 
ratification by the State Council, announced the “Development Policy of the Automobile Industry” 
(“NAP”)2 that would direct the future of China’s automobile sector.3 The NAP replaces the 
“Industrial Policy for the Automotive Sector” (“1994 Policy”) in effect since 1994.4 Following 
the NAP, other agencies promulgated laws to implement the NAP, including the: Automobile 
Trade Policy, Measures for Supervising the Sale of Brand Name Automobiles (still in draft 
version), and the Marketing Management Measures on Automobile Brand Names (scheduled to 
begin implementation on Jan. 1, 2005, but has not been enacted yet).  In China’s WTO Protocol 
of Accession (“Protocol”) containing its general commitments, China committed to amending the 
1994 Policy, to ensure compliance with WTO rules and principles.5
In this paper I will show that NAP does not conform to China's WTO commitments.  
Instead of promoting free market competition, the NAP aims to reorganize domestic dealerships 
into a few conglomerates in order to develop China’s own brand of cars.  The NAP and its 
implementing regulations achieve this goal by protecting the big three “state-related” Chinese 
automobile conglomerates at the expense of foreign automobile manufacturers and the mid to 
 
3 People’s Republic of China, hereinafter PRC, QICHE CHANYE FAZHAN ZHENGCE [POLICY 
ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY] adopted by the State Council on 
June 1, 2004, available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/, hereinafter NAP. 
 
4 PRC QICHE GONGYE CHANYE ZHENGCE [POLICY ON THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY], 
adopted by the State Council in 1994, available at 
http://business.sohu.com/2004/06/02/31/article220353167.shtml, hereinafter 1994 Policy. 
 
5 GATT, Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, at 41 (Nov. 10, 2001), hereinafter 
Report. 
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small-size domestic dealer.  I call these three conglomerates “state-related” rather than 
state-owned because the state has ownership in these companies but the extent of the state’s 
control is unclear.  The NAP discriminates against foreign automobile manufacturers and small 
to mid-sized domestic private dealers by treating the big three state-related domestic car producers 
better.   
 Someone pointed out that foreign investors have obtained a “super-national treatment” in 
China above domestic private dealers.6 But the government gives “extra-super national 
treatment” to protect its three state-related conglomerates against the big foreign manufacturers.  
China has opened up to the deep-pocketed foreigners just enough to benefit its conglomerates but 
has closed the door to smaller dealers, both foreign and domestic.  China treats its own people 
discriminatorily because the government perceives domestic private investment as “irresponsible 
investment.”7 Large amounts of private capital flowed into the auto industry starting in 2003 
because of the NAP.8 Private investors knew that the new policy would close the door on new 
investors so wanted to get in before this happened.9
This paper addresses subsidy programs, intellectual property rights protection, investment, 
importation, and distribution of entire new passenger cars.10 With each issue, I will discuss 
 
6 Jia Xinguang, Qiche Ye: Minqi “Weicheng” [Automobile Industry: Private Enterprises “Besiege 
City”] ZHONGGUO GONGSHANG [CHINA BUSINESS], vol 221, May 2004, at 68. 
 
7 Id. at 69. 
 
8 Id. at 65. 
 
9 Id. at 66. 
 
10 I narrowed this paper so that it is not about: auto parts, financing, used cars, consumer protection, 
commercial vehicles.   
4
China’s WTO commitments, the new Chinese laws passed that relate to the issue, and whether 
those laws comply with China's WTO commitments.  I will draw mainly on Chinese-language 
sources as well as English-language sources, which will allow me to mediate the culture gap 
between China and the world.   
II. China’s Automobile Industry 
A. Background 
China’s automobile industry has grown in three phases.  From 1956 to 1980, China 
manufactured its first car and there appeared a couple of automobile manufacturing plants.  From 
1981 to 1991, the automobile industry opened its doors to foreigners inviting in technology and 
capital to produce more and better cars. The state-related manufacturers Jiefang, Yaojing, and 
Huanghe upgraded its cars.  In 1994, the “Automobile Manufacturing Industry Policy” was 
passed which: established the three major car manufacturers: First Automotive Works Corp. 
(FAW), Dongfeng Motor Corp. (Dongfeng), Shanghai Automotive Industry Corp. (SAIC).11 
The automobile industry in China has grown rapidly since China entered the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).  China currently has more than 120 entire automobile manufacturers.12 
At the moment, China’s auto industry is dominated by fewer than a dozen domestic and foreign 
firms.13 The Big Three Chinese, state-related auto conglomerates--First Auto Works (FAW), 
 
11 1994 Policy, supra note 4. 
 
12 Guo Kaisen, Chanye Guancha: Kanbujian De Shou Yu Kandejian De Zhengce [Industry 
Observation: The Invisible Hand and the Visible Policy], IT JING LI SHIJIE [WORLD OF IT 
ECONOMIC THEORY], June 22, 2004, available at: 
http://www.hailang.org/enews/changye/auto/200406/6932.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2005). 
 
13 Andrew Yeh & Toshio Aritake, China Issues New Rules for Auto Makers, Aims at Cosolidations, 
Assists Foreign Firms 21 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 980 (June 10, 2004). 
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Shanghai Auto Industry Corporation (SAIC) and Dongfeng Motors--has captured 47 percent of the 
total market in 2001.14 “Germany’s Volkswagen AG and General Motors Co. together command 
about half of the domestic market. ”15 As of April 2004, imported cars constitute 3.6% of the 
Chinese automobile market.16 These cars are primarily imported from Germany (35.53%), Japan 
(28.31%), and Korea (25.75%).17 Analysts predict that in the next three years, multinational 
automobile companies will invest more than $10,000,000,000US in China.18
A draft version of the NAP had been circulating since Dec. 2002.  The NDRC received 
comments from: other relevant agencies, automobile industry representatives from tens of 
companies (including Sino-joint ventures), local development and reform commissions, other 
affected industries (i.e. oil), and experts.  In the end, the Chinese government had to make 
choices between competing interests: Chinese and foreigners, central and local governments, 
state-owned and private enterprises, within and outside the industry.  The Chinese government’s 
 
14 DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note 3. 
 
15 Yeh, supra note 13.   
 
16 Yu Wang, Qiche Maoyi Zhengce He Qiche Pinpgai Guanli Banfa Zheng Zai Zhiding [The 
Automobile Trade Policy and Automobile Brand Management Measures is Currently Being Formed]
ZHONGGUO QICHE BAO [CHINA AUTOMOBILE NEWSPAPER] 14 (June 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.anews.cn/anews/list.asp?id=18007 (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). 
 
17 2004 Nian Shang Ban Nian Jiaoche Jingkou Yungxing Taishi Fenxi [Analysis of the Trend of 
Passenger Cars Imported in the First Half of 2004] ZHONGGUO QICHE BAO [CHINA 
AUTOMOBILE NEWSPAPER] 36 (Aug. 31, 2004), available at 
http://www.anews.cn/anews/list.asp?id=20858 (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). 
 
18 Qiche Xin Zheng Chutai Anzhan Gei Waizi Yi Guomin Teyu [Behind-the-Scene Battle Over the 
Appearance of the NAP Gives Foreign Investors National Treatment] CAIJING SHIBAO [FORTUNE 
AND ECONOMIC TIMES], June, 22, 2004, available at:
http://info.auto.hc360.com/html/001/003/001/162291.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). 
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choices reflect in the final version of the policy and in a plethora of implementing regulations 
promulgated by various agencies.   
B. “State-Related” Conglomerates 
 The current layout of the domestic automobile manufacturing industry is “3+6”: the three 
conglomerates— FAW, Dongfeng, and SAIC—and the six major enterprises—Guangzhou Honda, 
Chongqing Changan Automotive, Anhui Chery, Brilliance Automotive, Nanjing City’s Fiat, and 
Zhejiang Province’s Geely.19 In addition, there a few second-tier companies: Shenzhen BYD [Bi 
Ya Di], Zhong Da Group, Xiang Torch, Shanghai’s Bao Feng, Guangzhou City’s Bao Long, 
Guizhou City’s New Century Automobile Investment Company, and Hua Xiang Group.20 
C. Domestic Private Manufacturers 
 The Chinese government has always monopolized the auto industry and has always been 
against private capital entering the industry.  For example, when the founder of Geely attempted 
to obtain a permit to manufacture its own brand of cars, he was told by an official: “Automobiles 
are a capital-intensive, technology-intensive industry.  Private companies can’t do it.”21 
Unlike most of the second-tier companies, which are privately-owned, most of the 
 
19 He Qigang, Woguo Qiche Chanye Nei Bingkou Chongzu Qushi Ji Qi Falu Zhidu Zhangai Fenxi 
[Analysis of The Trend and Legal Obstacles to Merging and Restructuring Within China’s Automobile 
Industry] (2003) available at:
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=23978 . 
 
20 Jia, supra note 6 at 67. 
 
21 Lu Feng, et. al., Jingcai Huigu: Zao Zhongguo Ziji De Qiche [Special Reflection: Building China’s 




first-tier companies are state-related.22 For example, "Chery is owned by the Anhui provincial 
government and has access to plenty of investment cash, including, it says, from Beijing."23 
Brilliance Automotive is owned by the Liaoning provincial government.24 The CEO of 
Brilliance Automotive is Baoshan Yang, the former assistant to the Governor of Liaoning province 
and the current Liaoning representative to the [liaoningsheng zhengxie changwei].25 Qinchuan 
Flyer is ultimately an offshoot of NORINCO, the commercial arm of the People’s Liberation 
Army.”26 Only Geely is a first-tier company that is privately-owned.27 The brothers Li, who 
own Geely, had made fortunes from the construction and motorcycle industries.28 
D. Foreign Manufacturers 
 In contrast to the “3+6” layout of the domestic automobile market, the current layout of 
the foreign automobile manufacturing industry is “6+3”: six foreign conglomaterates—General 
Motors, Daike, Ford, Toyota, Volkswagon, Leinuo [transcribed]—and the three big automobile 
 
22 Unclear if owned by the state but at least has government relations. 
 
23 1/31/05 Economist Intelligence Unit - Bus. China 1 
2005 WL 63069594, "Let's go global". 
 
24 He Yuxin, Automaker Brilliance in Showdown with Executives Over Stock Options, CAIJING, 
available at: http://www.caijing.com.cn/english/2004/040920/040920huachen.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 
2005).  
 
25 Ge Wen, Xin Huachen De Hou Yangrong Shidai [New Huacheng’s Post-Yangrong Era] FALU YU 
SHENGHUO [LAW & LIFE], vol. 259, April 1, 2004, 50. 
 
26 Id.
27Lu Feng, et. al., Jingcai Huigu: Zao Zhongguo Ziji De Qiche [Special Reflection: Building China’s 





enterprises—Honda, BMW, and Xuetielong [transcribed]. 29 China hopes to mirror these 
foreigners’ success by mimicking their structure.   
 
29 Jia, supra note 6, at 67. 
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III. NAP Violates China’s WTO Agreement 
The NAP can be broken down into the following categories: investment, export subsidies, 
importing, distribution, local requirements, and intellectual property (IP) protection. I will 
describe what the NAP provisions are regarding each topic and discuss how those provisions 
contradict China’s commitments to the WTO.   
A. Investment 
Although the government has eliminated the foreign currency balance and local 
production-related requirements on investment,30 the government has replaced these 
WTO-prohibited requirements with others designed to force production and development to occur 
domestically.   
1. Conditions on Investing 
 China’s Protocol containing its general commitments provides that: “China shall ensure 
that…the right of…investment…is not conditioned on:…performance requirements of any kind, 
such as local content, offsets, the transfer of technology, export performance or the conduct of 
research and development (R&D) in China.”31 During WTO negotiations, the Chinese 
representative added that: “Amendments would be made to ensure that all measures applicable to 
motor vehicle producers restricting the categories, types or models of vehicle permitted for 
production, would gradually be lifted.  Such measures would be completely removed two years 
after accession, thus ensuring that motor vehicle producers would be free to choose the categories, 
 
30 Guo, supra note 12.  
 
31 WTO, PROTOCOL ON THE ACCESSION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Nov. 23, 
2001, at 5, hereinafter Protocol. 
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types and models they produced.”32
However, China has placed conditions on investing including: performance requirements, 
research and development in China requirement, and restriction on the type of cars produced.  
Article 47, No. 5 of the NAP requires: “New manufacturers of automobiles must…establish 
research and development facilities…”33 Article 47 No. 6 of the NAP imposes the following 
performance requirement: “New car plants must have a minimum annual output of 50,000 units 
for four-cylinder cars and 30,000 units for six-cylinder cars.”34 Article 47 No. 4 of the NAP 
restricts the type of cars produced by requiring: “Automobile manufacturers that want to enter new 
product lines must have a record of batch-sized automobile production, have accumulated more 
than 1 billion RMB (1,000,000,000) of after tax profit in the last 3 years (have tax documentation), 
have assets and liabilities ratio of within 50%, and AAA level of bank credit.”35 
China’s conditioning of the right of investment on the number of cars produced, the 
establishment of research facilities in China, and the type of car produced, explicitly contravenes 
their commitment not to do so.  The requirement on a minimum amount of output from new car 
factories is a performance requirement on investment.  The requirement that new car factories 
establish R&D facilities also acts as a performance requirement on investment.  The conditions 
for entering into new product lines prevent the manufacturer from investing in new product lines.     
China protects its domestic manufacturers against foreign manufacturers with the 
 
32 Report, supra note 5, paragraph 205. 
 





performance requirement because it forces foreign manufacturers to produce at least 50,000 
four-cylinder cars and 30,000 six-cylinder cars in China.  Most foreign manufactures would 
rather produce all their car parts elsewhere, and then ship them to China for assembly.36 Instead 
of importing their inventory into China, foreign manufacturers will now need to produce at least a 
portion of the cars they sell in China.  Foreign manufacturers will now need to use their factories 
in China to produce cars rather than just for assembly. 
China protects its domestic manufacturers against foreign manufacturers with the R&D 
requirement because it forces the transfer of technology to China.  Similar to producing cars 
outside of China, foreign producers conduct R&D abroad to protect their trade secrets.  The 
requirement to setup R&D facilities in China forces foreign manufacturers to transfer their 
knowledge to China, which better enables China to nationalize their cars.  Many manufacturers 
may just establish one superficially because of the lack of utility of such a facility.37 
Although the conditions for entering into new product lines do not necessarily protect 
Chinese manufacturers against foreign manufacturers, it still directly contradicts China’s promises 
to the WTO member countries.   
2. Non-national Treatment in Ownership Limitation 
 Unlike manufacturers of motor vehicle engines, which China committed, “to remove the 
50 percent foreign equity limit for joint-ventures upon accession,”38 there was no mention of 
 
36 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Hearing on China’s Impact on the U.S. 
Manufacturing Base, 108th Congress, 26-27 (Jan. 30, 2004). 
 
37 Minqi Jinru Qiche Lingyu Tujing Bei “Xin Zheng” Yi Yi Dusi [Private Enterprises’ Methods of 
Entry Into the Automobile Sector Are Being Closed Off By the “New Policy”] SHIDAI SHANGBAO  
[TIMES BUSINESS PAPER], June 4, 2004,  available at:
http://news.chinacars.com/newsfiles/200406/87091.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2005). 
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removing the ownership limitation on joint ventures for the production of entire automobiles.  
However, one of the two basic tenets of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is 
the national treatment clause.  The national treatment clause mandates WTO members treat 
foreign individuals and foreign-funded enterprises no less favorably than Chinese individuals and 
enterprises.39 Thus under GATT, China must treat foreign manufacturers no less favorably than 
domestic manufacturers. 
 Nevertheless, Article 48 of the NAP prohibits “the Chinese partner’s stock percentage to 
fall below 50% in a Sino-joint venture for the production of entire cars, specific-purpose cars, 
agriculturally-used transport cars, and motorcycles. 40 Article 48 of the NAP provides that: “One 
foreigner may establish no more than two joint ventures for the production of the same type of 
automobiles.41 This restriction does not apply to acquisitions by the Sino-joint venture.42 
The NAP clearly discriminates against foreign manufacturers because they impose 
restrictions on them that are not imposed on domestic producers.  The Chinese partner may own 
more than half of the Sino-joint venture but the foreigner may not.  Chinese producers may 
establish more than two joint ventures to produce the same type of automobile but foreign 
producers may not.   
 China clearly protects its domestic manufacturers against foreign manufacturers by 
 
38 Report, supra note 5, at 41. 
 
39 GATT, supra note 5, article III. 
 





prohibiting the foreign partner of a Sino-joint venture from achieving majority ownership.  Most 
foreign investment in China’s automobile industry has taken the form of joint ventures.43 This 
limitation shows that China fears the takeover of its car plants by foreigners.  Nevertheless 
foreign manufacturers may still escape this limitation by forming Sino-sino-joint ventures in 
which two separate Chinese companies each own 25% of the company, but the foreign company 
owns 50%, and thus the majority share. 
China protects its domestic manufacturers against foreign manufacturers by permitting 
domestic producers to form as many joint ventures as they want, which enables them to better 
compete against foreign manufacturers that may only sell one or two types of cars.44 
Multinational corporations would prefer to choose two or more partners because they want to 
obtain more political resources, attack more markets, and reduce the risks of just relying on one or 
two partners.45 But because most of the multinational corporations have already entered China 
and have signed partnership contracts with the three major state-related enterprises, the new 
limitation of foreigners to two joint ventures precludes them from entering into any additional 
joint ventures or buying any domestic producers.  Also, this limitation prevents a foreign 
manufacturer from partnering with all three of the Chinese conglomerates and eventually 
controlling them.  For example, Volkswagon has already partnered with FAW and SAIC, and thus 
 
43 Wen Zhao, supra note 41. 
 
44 Xu Ke, Kuaguo Qi Chang: Yi Tao Banzi Guanyong Hai Shi Liang Tao Banzi Heshuan 
[Multinational Automobile Manufacturers: One Organization Useful or Two Organizations 
Worthwhile], SOHU ONLINE, Jan. 27, 2005, available at:




will not be able to partner up with Dongfeng.    
China’s major automobile companies have already formed multiple joint ventures with 
foreign automobile manufactures and will be able to continue to form more.  Below is a table of 
current joint ventures:46 
FAW 
Group 
Guangqi Dongfeng Shanghai Beiqi Changan Brilliance 
Automotive 
GM    X    
Toyota X X      
Honda  X X     
Benz     X   
Nissan   X     
Leinuo   X     
VW X   X    
Ford      X  
Mazda X       
Xuetielong   X     






3. Shift in Investment Approval Procedure 
For the expediency and efficiency of foreigners to obtain investment approvals, China agreed 
to “raise the limit within which investments in motor vehicle manufacturing could be approved at 
the provincial government level only, from the current level of US$30 million, to US$60 million 
one year after accession, US$90 million two years after accession, and US$150 million four years 
after accession.”47
However, instead of complying with its WTO commitment, China has changed its investment 
approval procedure completely by shifting from approval based on the amount invested to 
approval based on the type of cars produced.  The new approval procedure for investments 
provides two methods for approval: (1) filing and (2) examining and approving.48 The method 
applied depends upon the number of investors and the type of car produced.  Current automobile 
manufacturers that self-fund enlargements of production capacity for similar products and current 
automobile manufacturers that want to establish a new non-sole legal persons manufacturing 
enterprise in another location will only need to file with the provincial-level government’s 
investment supervision department to begin investment.49 However, newly-established 
automobile manufacturers and current automobile manufacturers that want to establish a new sole 
legal person manufacturing enterprise in another location, and current automobile manufacturers 
that want to produce another type of car, to allow provincial-level government’s investment 
supervision department to investigate and approve the investment project and then file with the 
 
47 Report, supra note 5, at 41. 
 
48 NAP, supra note 3, article 40. 
 
49 Id. at article 41 and 42.  
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National Development and Reform Commission before beginning the project.50
The NAP’s more stringent procedure for approving investments in new product lines and sole 
legal person manufacturing enterprises makes it more difficult for foreign manufacturers to 
produce different types of cars, as well as forcing them to partner with other investors if they do 
not have the money to fund the new manufacturing enterprise themselves.  Foreign 
manufacturers wanted to raise the provincial government approval limit because it would have 
“reduce[d] the number of bureaucratic hoops that companies must jump through to establish 
manufacturing operations.”51 Rather than living up to its promise, China revamped the entire 
procedure to maintain the same bureaucratic obstacles to foreign manufacturers with the new 
criteria of product type and investor number.  Moreover, a procedure that differentiates between 
the types of cars produced will make it easier to discriminate between products.  Although the 
provision applies to domestic manufacturers as well, China still acts protectionist by not following 
through with a key promise it made to foreign investors. 
 The NRDC’s rationale for revamping the approval system is to make it more centralized and 
efficient.  However, requiring sole investors in new manufacturing enterprises to be examined 
and approved by provincial and central authorities whereas not requiring the same for non-sole 
investors does not contribute to streamlining the procedure for these investors. 
B. Export Subsidies 
 China’s Protocol provides that: “China shall eliminate all subsidy programmes falling 
 
50 Id. at article 43 and 44. 
 
51 Hearing before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “China and the WTO: 
Compliance and Monitoring”, 108th Congress, Feb. 5, 2004, 93. 
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within the scope of Article 3 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [“SCM 
Agreement”] upon accession.”52 Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement prohibits “specific” 
export subsidies, meaning a subsidy available only to an enterprise or industry or group of 
enterprises or industries within the jurisdiction of the authority granting the subsidy that is 
contingent in law or in fact, upon export performance.53 Previously, China’s State Planning 
Commission (SPC) gave automotive production enterprises priority in obtaining loans and foreign 
currencies to encourage the export of whole vehicles.54 The SPC also gave automotive 
enterprises preferential tariff rates based on the rate of incorporation of imported technology into 
the production of automobiles.55 China committed in its Protocol to eliminate these subsidies by 
the year 2000.56 
Instead of eliminating export subsidies, however, China has renewed them in the new policy.  
Article 40 and 41 of the Automobile Trade Policy: encourages the export of automobiles and 
provides that the State “supports using the State Foreign Trade Development Fund [
] to develop the export of automobile products.”  Article 49 of the NAP provides that the 
restriction on stock ownership and the number of joint ventures does not apply to manufacturers in 
the export development zones that export all their products.57 
52 Protocol, supra note 31, at 7. 
 
53 WTO, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 3.1(a). 
 
54 Protocol, supra note 31, at 70-71. 
 
55 Protocol, supra note 31, at 72. 
 
56 Id.
57 NAP, supra note 3. 
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 Although China has eliminated the foreign currency and local content subsidies, China has 
created new export subsidies that violate the SCM Agreement.  The Chinese government gives 
the benefits of money and exemptions from the law to manufacturers that export automobiles.  
These benefits are export subsidies because they provide money and exemption from the stock 
ownership and joint venture limitations contingent upon exportation of automobiles.  Thus these 
benefits are subsidies prohibited by Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. 
C. Importation 
1. Limitation on Trading Throughout the Customs Territory 
China’s Protocol provides that: “Without prejudice to China's right to regulate trade in a 
manner consistent with the WTO Agreement, China shall progressively liberalize the availability 
and scope of the right to trade, so that, within three years after accession, all enterprises in China 
shall have the right to trade in all goods throughout the customs territory of China, except for 
those goods listed in Annex 2A which continue to be subject to state trading in accordance with 
this Protocol.”58 Automobiles are not listed in Annex 2A of the Protocol.59 
Article 58 of the NAP, on the other hand, provides that: “The state designates the following 
ports for the import of entire cars: Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, Huangpu, Manchuria[ ], 
Shenzhen, and Xinjiang (for the import of entire cars to be used in Xinjiang, and cars from the 
Commonwealth of Independent States ).”   
The NAP violates China’s commitment to open up trade throughout its customs territory 
because now cars may only pass through seven of China’s ports.  Previously, automobiles may 
 
58 Protocol, supra note 31, at 4. 
 
59 Id. at 53. 
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pass through any port in China.  This article of the NAP is protectionist because now, foreign 
manufacturers will have a more difficult time importing cars to China because imported cars may 
only enter through a few ports.   
2. End of Duty-Free Zones 
China’s Protocol provides that: “During the periods specified in Annex 3, the protection 
afforded by the measures listed in that Annex shall not be increased or expanded in size, scope or 
duration, nor shall any new measures be applied, unless in conformity with the provisions of the 
WTO Agreement.”60 This promise applies to automobiles because automobiles fall under Annex 
3.61 
Starting in the year 2005, all duty-free zones may no longer store cars destined to enter the 
domestic market.”62 Because imported cars will no longer be able to be stored in the duty-free 
zones, all duties must be paid upon arrival at the border.   
Banning automobile products from the duty-free zones contradicts China’s commitment not 
to expand protectionist measures because currently imported cars are permitted to be placed in the 
duty-free zones.  This article hurts foreign small retailers the most because they are the ones that 
use the duty-free zones as opposed to Chinese dealers.63 The word in the duty-free zones from 
Dalian City (foreign car manufacturer’s central retailer for the northeast region) to Tianjin City is 
 
60 Protocol, supra note 31, at 5. 
 
61 Id. at 53. 
 




that many small to mid-size auto import retailers are preparing to leave the import market.64
3. Classification of Kits as Entire Cars 
Foreign manufacturers import cars in the form of assemblies so that they may be taxed at the 
lower tariff rate for parts rather than entire cars.  Paragraph 93 of the Report states: “Certain 
members of the Working Party expressed particular concerns about tariff treatment in the auto 
sector.  In response to questions about the tariff treatment for kits for motor vehicles, the 
representative of China confirmed that China had no tariff lines for completely knocked-down kits 
(CKD) for motor vehicles or semi-knocked down kits (SKD) for motor vehicles.  If China 
created such tariff lines, the tariff rates would be no more than 10 per cent.”65 
The NAP classifies CKD and SKD as entire cars, and thus taxed at much more than 10 
percent.  Article 53 of the NAP requires that: “For the effective supervision by the relevant 
departments, automobile manufacturers importing SKDs or CKDs must declare to the Ministry of 
Commerce, the General Customs Administration (Customs), and the NDRC the model of car that 
is to be assembled and pay duty at the local customs administration office.”66 
Article 55 to 56 of the NAP delineates how Customs will classify entire cars vs. parts: “The 
following will be identified as constituting entire cars: car body (including the operator’s 
compartment) assemblies, engine assemblies, gearbox assembly, driving axle assembly, 
non-driving axle assembly, frame assembly, steering system, brake system, etc…The following 
 
64 Yu Wang, Mingnian Jinkou “Shuihuo Che” Jiang “Duan Dun” [Smuggled Cars Will be Cut from 
Its Roots Next Year] ZHONGGUO QICHE BAO [CHINA AUTOMOBILE NEWSPAPER] 32 (Oct. 
25, 2004), available at http://www.anews.cn/anews/list.asp?id=22451 (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). 
 
65 Report, supra note 5. 
 
66 NAP, supra note 3. 
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will be identified as constituting car assembly (kits): completely knocked-down kits (CKD) for 
motor vehicles or the import of assemblies or systems that one by one constitute a key component.  
Whenever the import of parts reaches or exceeds the regulated amount, it will be classified as 
constituting assemblies.”67 Also, “those that have been identified as constituting entire cars and 
reach the below conditions will be classified as entire cars: (1) import of car body (including 
operator’s compartment) and engine, these two major assemblies for car assembly [ ]; (2) 
import of car body (including operator’s compartment) or engine, one of these two major 
assemblies with 3 or more assemblies remaining for car assembly; or (3) import of car body 
(including operator’s compartment) and engine, these two major assemblies with 5 or more 
assemblies remaining for car assembly.”68 Article 54 of the NAP provides that: “The relevant 
authorities will investigate when administering quotas, import tariff, and other segments in 
approving product entry to strictly collect duty based on the tariff rate of entire cars versus parts to 
avoid tariff evasion.”69 Those entities that purposely conceal the importation of parts that make 
up entire vehicles, or import disassembled parts to assemble into entire vehicles, and do not report 
this to the authorities, and avoid the tariff and import-linked value-added tax [ ], 
will be treated as smuggling and ordered by Customs to make up for the tariff and import-linked 
value-added tax , or penalized criminally if more serious.70 
67 Id.
68 Id., article 57. 
 
69 NAP, supra note 3. 
 
70The National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Commerce, and General Customs 
Administration have formulated the “Method for Supervising the Import of Automobile Parts that 
Constitute Whole Cars” that was to be announced in Oct. 2004, available at:
http://www.szfzb.com/channel/read.asp?id=89459 (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).  
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 China has contradicted its commitment by classifying kits as entire vehicles and taxing 
them at the rate of entire vehicles, which is and will always be more than 10%.71 In the WTO 
case, Indonesia—Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Indonesia had a 200 
percent duty on imports of passenger cars.72 To avoid this high tariff rate, EC and US car 
producers shipped CKD kits to Indonesia and assembled them there.  The Panel found that the 
CKD kits and completed cars were like products because the CKD kits are effectively “cars in a 
box,” “they can properly be considered to have characteristics closely resembling those of a 
completed car.”73 However, unlike Indonesia, China committed not to tax kits as entire cars.  
Thus, even if CKDs are like assembled cars, they should not be taxed the same duty in China 
because China specifically promised not to do so. 
China argues that the NAP ties up loopholes of the previous law that had allowed evasion of 
taxes and government supervision.  According to an official from the NDRC, one of the goals of 
the new law is to: “Close loopholes in the current law to prevent tax avoidance by importing cars 
in parts to benefit from the lower tariff rate and manufacturers’ avoidance of manufacturing car 
parts domestically by importing parts and assembling them domestically.” 74 But the 
government is cracking down and closing this loophole in a way that favors domestic 
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cars is: 87032130.   
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by the DSB on July 23, 1998 (WT/DS54, 59 & 64/R). 
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manufacturers by sealing off a method in which foreigners accessed the Chinese market.   
Currently, most joint ventures import the parts of entire cars and assemble them domestically 
in China.  Importing “cars in a box” cuts down on production time so the cars can appear in the 
market faster and avoid the duty imposed on entire vehicles, because the duty imposed on car 
parts is less.  However, importing kits does not help transfer technology to China because the 
technology of how to produce the parts remains abroad.  The NAP will require foreign 
manufacturers to produce their cars in China or pay to produce them elsewhere.  This restricts the 
foreign manufacturers' freedom and cost-saving methods for production by forcing foreigner 
manufacturers to produce their cars in China rather than just assemble there, as well as violating 
China's promise not to impose restrictions on production.  The ultimate goal of the NAP is to 
further the transfer of technology to China, which assembly kits defeat.   
4. Condition on Import License 
 Motor vehicles have always been subjected to import licensing and import quota.  The 
import quota has been eliminated as of Jan. 1, 2005.75 China’s Protocol provides that: “China 
shall ensure that the distribution of import licences, quotas, tariff-rate quotas, or any other means 
of approval for importation, the right of importation…by national and sub-national authorities, is 
not conditioned on: whether competing domestic suppliers of such products exist; or performance 
requirements of any kind, such as local content, offsets, the transfer of technology, export 
performance or the conduct of research and development in China.”76 China’s Protocol provides 
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that: “Foreign individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises shall be accorded 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises in respect of 
the distribution of import and export licences and quotas.”77 
The NAP adds a new condition on obtaining an import license: only those companies 
obtaining manufacturer’s authorization may import cars.  Article 5 of the “Detailed Rules for 
Issuing Automatic Import Licenses for Automobile Products” lays out the new import licensing 
procedure: Those importing cars for retail must show proof of the manufacturer’s authorization in 
addition to following the standard procedure for importing goods as required by Customs.78 
Although foreign manufacturers wanted this provision to stop car smuggling,79 the 
requirement for authorization may discriminate against foreign manufacturers by requiring all 
import retailers to obtain the relevant agency’s approval of the make, model, and number of cars 
they will be allowed to import.  Now, the permit can only be used for the specific listed model 
and type of vehicle, whereas before, the permit was good for any type of vehicle as long as the 
emission level was the same.80 The decision of what cars to import will not be determined by the 
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importer but the government based on macroeconomic considerations rather than the retailer’s 
qualifications.”81 This new provision better enables the government to calculate the number and 
type of cars imported than the quota system did, and possibly discriminate based on the origin of 
the product.   
D. Distribution 
 China committed upon entry to the WTO to “treat foreign individuals and enterprises and 
foreign-funded enterprises no less favorably than other individuals and enterprises regarding the 
conditions under which their goods are marketed or sold, in the domestic market and for export.”82 
1. Separate Distribution Channels 
A dual retail system for the sale of domestic and imported cars has been a method to protect 
Chinese businesses and the Chinese automobile industry.83 Previously under the planned economy, 
domestically-produced and imported cars were sold through the same network because imported 
cars were sold by a single Chinese automobile trade company. 84 But after 1998, under the 
government’s automobile sales agent system, domestic automobile manufacturers requested the 
government to require retailers to register anew and sell only one brand of cars exclusively.85 
81 Wang, supra note 85. 
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Thereafter, even domestically-produced GMs were sold separately from imported GMs.  Thus in 
a Sino-joint venture, while the foreign partner controlled the technology, the Chinese partner 
controlled the distribution network.  The Chinese government has protected the Chinese partner 
of a Sino-joint venture by preserving the Chinese partner’s independence and control over the 
distribution channel.86 
The separation or merger of networks for distributing imported and domestically- 
produced cars has been a hot issue in the automobile industry.  “Simultaneously, the governments 
of the Western developed countries like the U.S., E.U., Japan, as well as various organizations (i.e. 
automobile associations and law firms) and automobile multinational corporations are using 
various methods at various events to lobby and pressure the Chinese government not to enact a 
separate distribution system or else it will report China to the WTO.87 Foreign automobile 
manufacturers value the distribution channel in China because profits ultimately derive from the 
sale of cars.  WTO requires countries treat imported cars the same as domestically-produced cars 
by allowing them to use the same distribution channels.88 
Although the NAP and one of its implementing legislation--the Measures for Supervising the 
Sale of Brand Name Automobiles (draft version)--are silent about whether imported cars must be 
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sold in a separate channel from domestically-produced cars, it is not supportive of treating the two 
alike.  The only mention in the new law of separate or same networks is in section 34, article 9 of 
the draft version of the “Measures for Implementing the Management of the Sale of Automobile 
Brands”: “Foreign or domestic automobile manufacturers selling their cars in China must quickly 
establish their own sales and service system for their brand of cars.  The foreign or domestic 
manufacturer can invest in the system itself or through a franchised retailer.  After a foreign or 
domestic investor has obtained the authorization of an automobile manufacturer through the 
proper procedure, he can then sell and service domestic and imported cars.” 89 
Separate is not equal and against the basic WTO rule of national treatment.  In the WTO 
case, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Korea had a dual 
retail system for beef, requiring imported and domestic beef be sold in different stores.90 The 
Appellate Body held that the dual retail system violated the national treatment clause because the 
law reduced imported beef’s access to normal retail channels and competitive opportunity.91 
Similarly, China’s dual retail system for imported and domestically-produced cars violates the 
national treatment clause.  According to a scholar of automobile distribution, because distribution 
is a commercial activity, and “WTO principles restrict the government’s interference in 
commercial activity, the government cannot state a hard rule in policy regarding the separation or 
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merging of distribution networks.”92 China knows this but instead of reforming the law to merge 
the retail of domestic and imported cars, the NAP allows foreigners and domestic retailers to sell 
domestic and imported cars, but does not say whether they can sell them together in one store.  
Since 2001, the Chinese government has researched 24 domestic automobile manufacturers and 
surveyed and debated with many multinational corporations regarding whether to merge or 
separate the distribution networks of domestically-produced and imported cars.93 In 2003, the 
relevant government bureau requested public comment on a draft version of an “Automobile 
Brand Management Measures” that called for separate networks, but was never implemented.94 
Thus, the NAP leaves the decision of whether to sell imported cars in the same 
distribution networks as domestic cars falls on the business for now because according to someone 
inside the industry, the ‘independence” of businesses have become customary.95 Previously, 
foreign manufacturers like BMW skirted the separation of distribution channels by registering two 
companies—one for the sale of imported BMWs and one for the sale of domestically-produced 
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BMWs.96 However, Article 48 of the NAP would seal this loophole by treating foreign 
enterprises that own multiple enterprises as one foreign enterprise.”97 Absent any specific 
regulations regarding distribution networks, foreign manufacturers are testing the Chinese 
government to see if they can merge the distribution channels themselves.  For example, 
Germany’s Audi Automobile Corporation has quietly begun to sell imported Audis and 
domestically-produced Audis in the same network in 40 of its 70 dealerships in China.98
2. Conditions on the Sale of Imported Cars 
Furthermore, the NAP and its implementing legislation place conditions on the sale of cars by 
foreign manufacturers.  Article 7 of the Measures for Supervising the Sale of Brand Name 
Automobiles (draft version) require foreign car companies to have only one central agent [ ]
in charge of car sales.99 Article 21 of the Measures for Supervising the Sale of Brand Name 
Automobiles (draft version) limits foreign investors with 30 or more automobile retail stores in 
China from investing more than 49% before Dec. 11, 2006.100 
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These two provisions treat foreign manufacturers less favorably than domestic manufacturers 
in the sale of cars because it places conditions on retail by foreign manufacturers.  Domestic 
automobile manufacturers can directly be responsible for designating and implementing the 
marketing plan, or authorize another domestic enterprise to act as its central retailer responsible 
for designating and implementing the marketing plan.  But foreign automobile manufacturers 
selling cars domestically must authorize a domestic enterprise or form a domestic enterprise, 
according to the relevant laws, to act as its central retailer, responsible for designating and 
implementing the marketing plan.” 101 The 49 percent limitations prevents foreign automobile 
manufacturers from expanding its retail chain exclusively, which does not apply to domestic 
retailers.  
E. Local Requirements 
Local government bureaucracy and competition has been a great barrier to the domestic 
industry by preventing central government’s enforcement of regulations and inhibiting domestic 
production.102 
101 Id.
102 According to China Hubei Official Urges Talks with Shanghai on Removing Protectionist Auto 
Laws CHINAONLINE (Dec. 23, 1999), available on LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, 
competition between local governments worsened to the point that the local governments of Shanghai 
and Hubei had to enter into talks to negotiate removing protectionist auto laws.  Shanghai had adopted 
“protectionist measures concerning the purchase of cars by government offices, taxi companies, 
privately owned enterprises and individuals.  For example, when Shanghai government offices replace 
their cars, they [would] not be charged an RMB10,000 (US$1,209) office-expenditure-control fee if 
they buy a Santana sedan (which is produced in Shanghai) but will have to pay this fee if they buy 
other cars.  Also, license plates for a privately owned Santana cost only RMB20,000 (US$2,418), 
while those for privately owned cars made in other provinces cost at least RMB80,000 (US$9,674).  
In response to Shanghai’s measures, the Hubei Provincial Automobile Industry Administrative Office 
announced in October that when owners of Santana sedans applied in Hubei for license plates, they 
would have to pay an additional RMB70,000 (US$8,464), which goes to the Relief Fund for 
31
China’s Protocol on Accession provides that: “Import and export prohibitions and restrictions, 
and licensing requirements affecting imports and exports shall only be imposed and enforced by 
the national authorities or by sub-national authorities with authorization from the national 
authorities.  Such measures which are not imposed by the national authorities or by sub-national 
authorities with authorization from the national authorities, shall not be implemented or 
enforced.”103
Article 62 of the NAP: Prohibits local governments from discriminating against cars 
produced in other parts of China.104 Local governments established vehicle and traffic 
regulations, approval of licenses, environmental standards, government acquisition, taxi 
replacement, and other tactics to increase the sales of locally-produced cars.105 Local 
protectionism resulted from local governments assisting the development of manufacturers with 
factories in their area because it helps develop the locality, but caused barriers to cars produced in 
other areas of China.106 
The lack of uniformity is a major impediment for foreign manufacturers doing business in 
China and violates China’s commitment to only have national and sub-national authorities impose 
licensing requirements.  Rihai Liu, business consultant for General Motors in Shanghai, while 
recounting the establishment of GM in Shanghai about three years ago commented: “China is a 
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new market.  Even the market condition in Shanghai and Beijing are very different…Many 
things in China is out of your control.”107 Every automobile manufacturing company’s 
government affairs personnel has had the experience of running around between agencies.108 For 
example, a long-time employee of an automobile manufacturer in Beijing describes that for a 
while the procedure for approval became very complex: To obtain a product certificate, he had to 
run to the Transportation Bureau and the Public Security Bureau, and then to the Machinery 
Bureau, Inspections Bureau, and Environmental Protection Bureau.109 He commented: “If we 
miss one stamp, we cannot produce or distribute our product.”110 
Also, multiple local laws are bad for China because it prevents the growth of the car 
industry.  If local protectionism persists, the industry will not develop because it had severed the 
uniformity of the market.  An influential article in CHINA YOUTH DAILY states: “Because 
under the current system in China, automobile companies do not have a mechanism for dealers to 
leave the industry, and local governments interfere with the market.  Intense competition has 
made it hard to achieve the goal of ‘survival of the fittest.’  In fact the exact opposite might 
happen.  The first to fall are likely to be the good companies that comply with the law but cannot 
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obtain protection from the local government.  Instead, those small companies without 
technological capability but obtain local government protection may be prolonging its existence.  
The businesses that cannot survive on their own obtain beneficial pricing from the local 
government or free land, thus allowing them to outlive upright enterprises.  This result would be 
the exact opposite of the goal of industry development.  At a time when multinational companies 
are massively entering China, it is likely to prevent automobiles from becoming an industry that 
helps China continue to develop.”111 Yet the NDRC’s policies may be overridden by local 
governments because the State Council has only given it general regulatory powers rather than 
specific approval powers, which are the more effective administrative tool to limiting the 
overheating of investment.112  
F. IP Protection 
Currently, Chinese manufacturers have the authorization to use the intellectual property right 
of foreign manufacturers, but hang the brand name of a foreign company.113 According to Ying 
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Zhao, a researcher at the China Academy of Social Sciences’ Industry and Economics Research 
Institute, China’s main state-owned think tank, “because China does not have its own independent 
development, the majority of Chinese car producers lack their own intellectual property.”114 
A foremost concern of foreign investors is protection of intellectual property.  Members of 
the Working Party raised those concerns upon China’s WTO entry to which the representative of 
China stated that it would further its compliance with the Trade-Related Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) Agreement by “crack[ing] down on all serious infringements” and “improv[ing] 
the system for providing damages for trademark infringement.”115 
Instead of strengthening IP and trademark protection, the Chinese government has called for 
the development of China’s own intellectual property rights.  Article 6 of the NAP focuses on the 
creation of brand cars.116 Article 24 of the NAP states: “Automobile manufacturing enterprises 
should strengthen their knowledge of their business and product, actively develop products with 
independent intellectual property, emphasize protection of intellectual property, raise recognition 
of their company’s models and types in investing and distribution activities, and guard the 
reputation of their company’s models and types.” 117 The Appendix of the NAP defines 
“self-owned intellectual property right” as an “enterprise where the industrial property right, right 
to improve, right to authorize, and right to transfer the technology of products were developed by 
oneself , together with another, or developed by employing another.” 118 According to Article 27 
 
114 Id.
115 Report, supra note 5, 56. 
 




of the NAP: “Manufacturers may use various methods to develop oneself such as on one’s own, 
with a partner, or employing others.  Enterprises that develop its own products through research 
will receive tax benefits.”119 Article 25 suggests that: “All car, motorcycle, engine, and parts’ 
manufacturers should register their company’s trademark according to the Trademark Law.”   
 Instead of protecting foreigner’s IP rights through the many ways that China lays out in 
the Protocol, the NAP focuses on developing Chinese IP rights.  Foreign manufacturers would 
not benefit from the development of intellectual property because they have already developed 
their own brand name.  The government is encouraging self-development of IP rights to protect 
its domestic companies.  Liang Qiao, the foremost scholar on China’s automobile industry, 
advocates for China to develop its own brand of automobile to avoid the domestic market from 
becoming marginalized by foreign brands.120 
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120 Ge Subiao and Qiao Liang, Zhongguo Qiche Pinpai Bixu Fangzhi “Bianyuan Hua” [China’s 
Automobile Brands Must Prevent “Marginalization”] XINHUA ONLINE, July, 19, 2004, available at:




IV. Goal of China’s NAP 
A. Communist Concept of Corporations 
After the Communist Party of China (CPC) came to power in 1949, Mao Zedong, the 
Chairman of the CPC began a series of reforms.  In the industrial sector, the CPC setup 
state-owned enterprises (SOE), which were the foundation of China’s economy and continues to 
be its mainstay.  A SOE is a business owned and operated by the state for industrial output.  
Also, the SOE provided social welfare services to its workers and their families including: housing, 
schooling, medical care, and pensions.  Workers’ professional and personal lives revolved around 
the SOE.  The SOEs became very inefficient because of their lack of autonomy from the State 
and their social welfare role.   
When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he reformed China’s command economy to a 
socialist market economy.  Unlike the U.S. market economy, the socialist market economy still 
limits private ownership and preserves the state sector as a dominant portion of the economy.121 
The private sector is viewed as a complement to the state sector, with most of the economy 
remaining state-owned and controlled.122 Prior to economic reform, 83% of China’s industrial 
output.123 By 1994, SOEs produced 38% of industrial output.124 In 2000, SOEs accounted for 
 







48.3% of China’s industrial output.125
Contrary to the WTO’s major goal of creating and fostering free market economies, the 
Chinese government reverts to its non-market roots by adopting legislation aimed at reorganizing 
its automobile industry into fewer and larger companies--which happen to be the former 
state-owned enterprises that monopolized the automobile industry pre-WTO entry.  The Chinese 
government encourages the three conglomerates by disadvantaging current and future smaller 
competitors, many foreign but also domestic producers.  China seems to be growing its Chinese 
car companies into bigger manufacturers so that they may better compete internally and externally 
with foreign manufacturers.  As the Chinese government has noted, its "eventual goal is to have 
innovative homegrown vehicle makers that can export a sizable number of cars and parts.”126 
Beijing wants to “develop state-controlled firms into globally competitive firms, and the auto 
sector is a key strategic industry.”127 
Wei Xie, an analyst at the Beijing Automotive Industry Development and Research Institute, 
argues that: “The method for elimination is very market-oriented.”128 However, I will argue that 
enacting the NAP to force small manufacturers to leave the industry is non-market because it 
protects and grows three state-related companies.  The provisions in the NAP that I have already 
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mentioned illustrate this motive.     
B. Investment 
1. Conglomeration 
 The NAP states explicitly in Article 13 that: “The state encourages conglomeration to 
develop the automotive industry.”  Article 6 of the NAP provides that: “Enterprises with more 
than 15 percent share of the market can constitute an automotive conglomerate and individually 
report its development strategy to the NDRC, and may implement it after approval.”129 
According to 2003 statistics, FAW Group makes up 20.54% of the market, SAIC has 18.21%, and 
Dongfeng has 10.68% of the market.130 So far, only FAW Group and SAIC satisfy the new law’s 
definition of a “large-scale automobile conglomerate.”131 Not even the third major automobile 
manufacturer in China, Dongfeng, fulfills the requirement.132 
The same philosophy for SOEs as the way to carry the economy and care for society is used 
to justify the creation of fewer and larger state-related conglomerates.  Yushi Tian, CEO of FAW 
Group—Ford—Audi said at the annual meeting of China’s Automobile Parts Companies that 
state-related automobile enterprises need to group together; otherwise the biggest in China may 
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not be able to compete against the large multinational corporations.133 Hongwei Fang, CEO of 
Shanqi, agrees with the support of large conglomerates because “it is the best way to optimize 
society’s resources and cure chaos in the industry.”134 
2. Higher Capital Requirement 
Article 47 of the NAP establishes higher capital requirements for new manufacturers: 
“Producers of engines for newly-built cars must not invest less than RMB1.5 billion 
(1,500,000,000), of which free-flowing cash must not fall below RMB500,000,000...”135 Article 
47, No. 5 of the NAP requires: “New manufacturers of automobiles must invest more than RMB2 
billion (2,000,000,000).  At least RMB800 million (800,000,000) of which must derive from the 
investor himself...”136 Thus, 40% of the required capital must come from the investor himself 
rather than another source.   
The higher capital limits prevent small domestic enterprises from entering the automobile 
industry because they have less capital and are prohibited from using foreign capital.  Previously, 
domestic enterprises would enter the automobile industry by partnering with a multinational 
corporation.  Because the “Temporary Regulation on Foreign Investors Acquiring Domestic 
Enterprises” considers foreign investors who purchase domestic enterprises legal stockholders 
 
133 Guo, supra note 12. 
 
134 Liu Xiaoyong, Watching Product Development: The New Policy Warms People’s Hearts [Guanzhu 
Chanpin Kaifa: Xin Zhengce Nuan Ren Xin], CHINA AUTOMOBILE PAPER [ZHONGGUO QICHE 
BAO], June 2, 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/auto/2004-06/02/content_1503199.htm 
 (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). 
 




only after they hold onto the stock for more than a year, domestic capital can first be used to 
establish a company to attract foreign investment, and then accumulate the capital to purchase or 
become an automobile manufacturer.137 However, the NAP seals off this method of entry by 
prohibiting domestic investors from attainting the capital requirement through foreign sources. 
3. Joint Venture Limitation 
The NAP’s limitation on foreigners to two joint ventures favors the three major Chinese 
automobile conglomerates that are competing against the smaller manufacturers for joint ventures 
with foreign manufacturers.  Because foreign manufacturers may only choose two partners, they 
will be more inclined to partner with one of the three major Chinese conglomerate, rather than any 
of the second-tier domestic car companies, whom they would probably have greater leverage over.    
Thus, whichever one of the three major conglomerates the foreign manufacturer partners with 
will have more leverage over the foreign manufacturer.  For example, instead of partnering up 
with FAW Group directly, Ford had Mazda (1/3 owned by Ford) partner with FAW Group because 
Ford already had one partner, Changan Automotive, who opposed Ford partnering with FAW 
Group, and Ford wanted to keep its second and last joint venture allotment available.138 Because 
Mazda is weaker than Ford, FAW Group would have the controlling voice in their partnership. 
4. Easier Approval for Conglomerates 
 The Chinese government also displays favoritism to conglomerates in its dual approval 
procedure.  Article 45 of the NAP provides that conglomerates, defined as companies with more 
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than 15 percent market share, just need to file their development plan with the NDRC to begin 
new investment projects.139 The NAP’s more stringent procedure for approving investments only 
applies to investments by new sole legal persons, which makes it more difficult for independent 
investors to setup new manufacturing enterprises.  The Chinese government usually “suspends or 
altogether stops approval of foreign investments in areas of the economy that have already 
received sufficiently large amounts of capital and that are already developed.”140
5. Performance Requirement 
The NAP’s requirement that new car plants produce a certain number of cars annually forces 
the smaller, privately-owned domestic producers to shut down.  Presently, each of the provinces 
in China has at least one automobile manufacturing plant.141 Most of these are small, producing 
10,000 to 35,000 cars per year.142 Because many enterprises entered the industry blindly, this 
caused the production of cars to be chaotic and weak.143 There are more than 20 of these “zero 
enterprises” that produce close to nothing.144 For example, Tangshan Automobile Manufacturing 
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Limited Company has three employees receiving wages, but has produced only one car in the past 
four years.145 
6. End of Permit Sales 
 Buying permits has been the way that most private investors entered the industry because 
of the government’s strict standards on automobile products.146 Private domestic investors would 
buy an automobile company’s right to operate, and not change names at first but just use the 
licensed company’s items, then strategize about how to develop.147 
Article 17 of the NAP: “Prohibits automobile manufacturers from selling their production 
licenses to anyone outside of the automobile manufacturing business.”148 This provision stops 
another method of entry into the automobile industry, which is another way to protect the major 
conglomerates.   
The prohibition on selling automobile manufacturing permits to those outside of the industry 
forces conglomeration because those that want to leave the industry may only sell to another 
automobile manufacturer or merge with another.149 According to Huang Taiyan, a professor at 
People’s University’s Economics School in Beijing: “This [prohibition] contradicts the ideal of 
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complete competition.  The new automobile industry policy protects the existing 123 automobile 
manufacturer…The result of this protection is that a few large-scale state-owned enterprises will 
become abnormal [ ] monopolies.”150 
C. Importation 
1. Classification 
 Another bar on entry into the industry to protect China’s existing conglomerates is the 
NAP’s classification of CKD and SKD kits as entire cars.  Such a classification system 
“forecloses all new foreign investments and effectively precludes foreign competition from global 
rivals for those companies that invested early in China.”151 An industry insider asked 
rhetorically: “Is there any joint venture that when they first invested, did not first use imported 
cars or CKD, SKD?  Now this policy prohibits using these methods to supplement certification.  
This will definitely have detrimental effect on the previous period’s popularity of assembling 
cars.”152 
2. End of Duty-Free Zones 
The NAP’s elimination of duty-free zones hurts small retailers because they will have to 
decide on their own and take more risk in: what cars they import, at what price to import those 
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cars, and whether they will quickly sell after entry.153 Retailers must have three times more cash 
on hand than they needed previously when they could store their cars in the duty-free zone and 
wait until they found a buyer to pay duties.154 
D. Distribution 
 The requirement that all retailers have manufacturer’s authorization eliminates most 
dealers.  This policy benefits big and hurts small-sized retailers because the big ones are the ones 
that already have authorizations from the manufacturer or from their joint ventures.  According 
to statistics from the Beijing City Automobile Circulation Society, there are more than 2,000 
automobile dealers in Beijing now, 80% of which will no longer be able to operate under the new 
policy unless they obtain a manufacturer’s authorization.155 Almost 80% of the dealers in 
Shanghai have not obtained the authorization of the original manufacturers.156 Currently, mid to 
small-sized retailers are leaving the automobile industry, while the big ones are obtaining more 
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E. IP Protection 
A manager of Hafei Automobile Company thinks that the new policy’s support of 
independent development is to develop Chinese automobiles with independent products with 
independent labels and independent intellectual property rights so that they may break into the 
global market.158 The Chinese government’s call for domestic manufacturers to develop their 
own intellectual property marks a shift in strategy from the last ten years of obtaining technology 
through transfers from foreigners.  China is shifting strategies because the previous strategy of 
joint ventures is not succeeding in transferring technology.  This strategy is not working for a few 
reasons. 
At the time of forming a joint venture, there were not detailed research demands or specific 
times for the transfer of technology, nor high-level industry policy regulating the rules of the 
game.159 Thus, the foreign partner brought in out-dated technology causing China to continue to 
rely on them.160 Also, these large Chinese companies are more interested in attracting foreign 
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capital and ramping up production than researching new technologies.161
Also, any success in technology transfer is now at risk of suit for IP rights violation.  
Since 2003, IP disputes have erupted due to the conflict of interest between China--which wants to 
barter technology for cheap Chinese labor, and multinational companies--which neither want to 
share their technology nor give anything in return for the cheap labor.  Disputes began to occur in 
2003 between Nissan and Great Wall Automobile (a domestic Chinese company), Toyota and 
Geely, and GM and Gery.162 The situation became so bad that the Vice Minister of Commerce 
had to call a meeting between GM and Gery to avoid any legal action.163 China’s first IP case 
involves Toyota suing Geely in Beijing Highest People’s Court, alleging that Geely’s model Meiri 
copies Toyota’s “Toyota” insignia, thus violating Toyota's trademark.164 But Toyota lost this case 
for lack of proof.165 The disputes continued in 2004 when Honda sued Hebei Province’s 
Shuanghuan Automobile Company and its retailer, the Beijing Xu Yang Heng Xing Economic and 
Trade Limited Company [ ], in Beijing’s Highest People’s Court for 
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pirating the Honda CRV.166 Moreover, in December 2004, Dongfeng joined Honda in its suit 
against Shuanghuan, marking the first time a Chinese partner in a Sino-joint venture sued a 
domestic private company.167 
V. Conclusion 
China has implemented new measures that do not conform with the WTO Agreement.  
Although China does not have to completely eliminate its restrictions on the automobile industry 
because it is subject to phased elimination, China must not increase those restrictions, which it has 
through the NAP.  The NAP will protect its three state-related automobile manufacturers from 
foreign manufacturers by limiting foreign investment, providing export subsidies, burdening 
importing, separating distribution, adding local requirements, and creating Chinese IP rights. 
 Contrary to the WTO’s encouragement of creating free market conditions, China reverts 
to the command economy of the Mao-era rather than letting in more competition to let the market 
forces guide the industry because it feels that that is the quickest way to eventually exporting 
Chinese-brand of cars.  This year, China exported US$4,700,000,000 worth of entire cars.168 
China hopes to: “become the major automobile manufacturing country in the world before 
the year 2010.  To have automobile products satisfy the majority of domestic demand and enter 
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the global market in batch-sizes.”169 China may achieve this goal even with all of the NAP’s 
WTO violations because by the time the implementing legislation detail the protections and other 
member countries collect the statistics on the discriminatory effects, it may be the year 2010. 
 If the rest of the world waits to see the effects of the NAP, it may be too late.  
According to the director of the Office of Automobile Affairs at the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, the U.S. will begin to import large numbers of cars produced in China in the year 
2010.170 But by that time, China may have already developed its three state-related automobile 
manufacturers into the world’s major exporters.  
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